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Abstract
Whereas the measurement of the quality of democracy focused on the rough differentiation of democracies and autoc-
racies in the beginning (e.g. Vanhanen, Polity, Freedom House), the focal point of newer instruments is the assessment
of the quality of established democracies. In this context, tensions resp. trade-offs between dimensions of democracy
are discussed as well (e.g. Democracy Barometer, Varieties of Democracy). However, these approaches lack a systematic
discussion of trade-offs and they are not able to show trade-offs empirically. We address this research desideratum in
a three-step process: Firstly, we propose a new conceptual approach, which distinguishes between two different modes
of relationships between dimensions: mutual reinforcing effects and a give-and-take relationship (trade-offs) between di-
mensions. By introducing our measurement tool, Democracy Matrix, we finally locate mutually reinforcing effects as well
as trade-offs. Secondly, we provide a new methodological approach to measure trade-offs. While one measuring strategy
captures the mutual reinforcing effects, the other strategy employs indicators, which serve to gauge trade-offs. Thirdly, we
demonstrate empirical findings of our measurement drawing on the Varieties of Democracy dataset. Incorporating trade-
offs into themeasurement enables us to identify various profiles of democracy (libertarian, egalitarian and control-focused
democracy) via the quality of its dimensions.
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1. Introduction
One unresolved question of the measurement of democ-
racy is the existence of trade-offs between dimensions,
that is to say, whether their relationship is charac-
terized by tensions and conflicting goals, which result
in trade-offs between them. Even though newer in-
dices of democracy (Democracy Barometer, Varieties of
Democracy/V-Dem) mention the idea of trade-offs, they
are, however, not able to demonstrate trade-offs empir-
ically. Giebler and Merkel (2016, p. 602) state, based on
the Democracy Barometer data, that in contrast to the
“traditional libertarian fear of a trade-off between free-
dom and equality…, we find that the two core principles
of democracy (freedom and equality) possess a mutually
reinforcing association”. Similarly, V-Dem mentions the
idea of trade-offs in their conceptual paper (Coppedge,
Gerring, Altman, & Bernhard, 2011), but they seem to
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 78–91 78
not be able to detect these trade-offs empirically, e.g.
cases can be identified with the highest rating in the free-
dom dimension and in the equality dimension simulta-
neously (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning, & Teorell, 2015,
p. 9). Why is this the case?
We argue that there are at least two reasons: on
the one hand, these measures lack a deep discussion
of the conceptual foundations of trade-offs missing not
only the detection of concrete realization of trade-offs
but also their interconnectedness with different abstract
conceptions of democracy. This means that current mea-
sures of democracy content themselves with only a short
remark about trade-offs on the highest aggregated level
(dimensions or principles) but do not consider these
conceptual consequences for lower or mid-level com-
ponents of democracies (institutions). In fact, no defi-
nite characterization or, to be more precise, definition of
trade-offs has ever beenmade, even in themore theoret-
ical discussions about the quality of democracy (see for
a general discussion Diamond & Morlino, 2005). On the
other hand, they lack an adequate empirical measure-
ment strategy by not adapting their measurement and
aggregation stage to capture the different “nature” of
trade-off relationships. Current measures of democracy
use unidimensional indicators to measure an actual two-
dimensional relationship resulting in a blind spot con-
cerning trade-offs. This article tackles these two concep-
tual and methodological problems: how can we under-
stand trade-offs conceptually and how can we success-
fully incorporate them in a measurement of the quality
of democracy?1
Thus, to close this research gap, this article proceeds
in three steps: firstly, we propose a new conceptual ap-
proach, which is able to define and distinguish between
two different modes of relationships between dimen-
sions (section 2): mutual reinforcing effects between di-
mensions and a give-and-take relationship (trade-offs).
By introducing our measurement tool, Democracy Ma-
trix, which combines three dimensions (political free-
dom, political equality and political and constitutional
control) with five central democratic functions, we lo-
cate trade-offs. On the basis of these three dimen-
sions, we propose three ideal typical profiles of democ-
racy: libertarian, egalitarian and a control-focused profile
of democracy.
Secondly, we provide a new methodological ap-
proach to measure trade-offs (section 3): two indepen-
dent measurements are combined to assess the quality
of democracy. While one measuring strategy applies in-
dicators commonly used in other indices (such as Free-
dom House or Varieties of Democracy) relying on a uni-
dimensional interpretation, the other strategy employs
indicators which serve to assess trade-offs by incorpo-
rating and expressing the two-dimensional relationship
which is characteristic for trade-offs. We call the former
type of indicators “quality measuring indicators” and the
latter “trade-off indicators”.
Thirdly, we demonstrate empirical findings of our
measurement drawing on the Varieties of Democracy
dataset (section 4). Incorporating trade-offs into the
measurement enables the identification of various pro-
files of democracy via the quality of its dimensions.
2. Conceptual Considerations: Quality and Profiles of
Democracies
2.1. The Democracy Matrix: A New Measurement Tool
Which Combines Mutual Reinforcing Effects and
Trade-Offs between Dimensions
The Democracy Matrix is based on the 15-Field-Matrix
(Lauth, 2004, 2015). The 15-Field-Matrix combines
three dimensions with five central democratic functions:
Whereas the dimension of freedom captures the ex-
tent of the free self-determination of the citizens based
on civil and political rights, the equality dimension en-
compasses legal egalitarianism and the actual realiza-
tion of those rights (input-egalitarianism). The control di-
mension takes into account the protection of the two
other dimensions through legal control performed by ju-
diciaries and political control performed by intermedi-
ary institutions, media and parliament. On the one hand,
this democracy conception is primarily rooted in Dahl’s
(1971) widely acknowledged distinction between “con-
testation” and “participation” which is resembled in the
dimensions of freedom and equality. On the other hand,
it adds a third dimension, control, to capture the de-
ficient functioning of horizontal accountability and the
rule of law.2 This extension of the conception is due to
the basic conviction that democracy is a type of limited
rule. The analysis of third wave democracies, which of-
ten have shown significant deficits regarding horizontal
accountability and rule of law (O’Donnell, 1994), demon-
strates the relevance of this third dimension of control.
In addition, five central functions cut across these
three dimensions concretizing the quality of democ-
racy. The “procedures of decision” function analyzes the
democratic quality of representative elections and direct
democracy. The “regulation of the intermediate sphere”
captures the democratic performance of interest aggre-
gation and interest articulation by parties, interest orga-
nizations and civil society. “Public communication” eval-
uates the functioning of the media system and the pub-
lic realm. The “guarantee of rights” function analyzes the
democratic quality of the court system, whereas the last
function, “rules settlement/implementation”, focuses on
the democratic quality of the work carried out by the
executive and legislature. This unfolds 15 matrix-fields
1 We are not convinced that the theoretical assumption of the existence of trade-offs could be wrong, although we will stress this possibility in our
discussion as well.
2 In a sense, this third dimension reflects the binding or limiting mechanism of democratic rule, which Dahl (1956) highlights under the termMadisonian
democracy.
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which supports the analysis of the quality of democracy
in an elaborate manner.
The Democracy Matrix enhances the concept of
the 15-Field-Matrix by distinguishing between two basic
types of relations between dimensions: mutual reinforc-
ing effects and trade-offs. While the mutual reinforcing
effects are already sufficiently captured by the 15-Field-
Matrix, the inclusion of the concept andmeasurement of
trade-offs is the additional feature of the DemocracyMa-
trix. Figure 1 presents trade-offs inside the Democracy
Matrix, which we have identified.
The idea of mutual reinforcing effects between di-
mensions can usually be found in all measures of democ-
racy: The Variety of Democracy-project describes this
type of relationship for freedom and equality by stating
“that to some extent the contribution of one attribute
depends on the presence of the other. If, say, opposi-
tional candidates are not allowed to run for election, or
the elections are fraudulent, it does not matter much for
the level of electoral democracy that all adults have vot-
ing rights” (Coppedge et al., 2015, p. 6). The concept of
the Democracy Barometer is based on “the assumption
of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a mem-
ber of the category democracy” (Merkel et al., 2016, p. 8).
In addition, Diamond andMorlino (2004, pp. 28–29) sup-
pose that the “dimensions are closely linked and tend to
move together, either toward democratic improvement
and deepening or toward decay”. This means that dimen-
sions are not only necessary to understand democracy,
but they are also mutually dependent. One dimension
cannot exist without the other. The close relationship
between freedom and equality has been emphasized by
Dworkin (1996, p. 57): “So we have come, by different
routes, beginning in different traditions and paradigms,
to conceptions of liberty and equality that seem not only
compatible, butmutually necessary”. Dahl (1971) empha-
sizes that a democracy (polyarchy) is only present if both
attributes—contestation and participation—are fulfilled.
In terms of democratic theory, freedom without a mini-
mum level of equality is as difficult to conceive as equality
without freedom. Control, which is required for their pro-
tection and enforcement, is checked by constitutionally-
set standards of freedom and equality, thereby constrain-
ing the unlimited exercise of power. Campbell, Carayan-
nis and Scheherazade (2015) refer to the three dimen-
sions of freedom, equality and control, but add with
“sustainable development” a fourth dimension to their
Quadruple dimensional structure of democracy, which is
likewise constructed in a reinforcing perspective.
This mutual reinforcing effect between the dimen-
sions expresses the baseline concept of the Democracy
Matrix: all dimensions and thus all 15 matrix fields must
work to a sufficient degree for a country to be classified
as a democracy. Insofar the DemocracyMatrix shares the
assumptions of the other indices, it differs in the way it
conceptualizes and incorporates trade-offs. This concep-
tion implies—as it will be shown below—the combina-
tion of two procedures of measurement.
2.2. Conception and Identification of Trade-Offs
Despite the complementary relationship structure, po-
tential tensions between dimensions are impossible to
ignore according to political philosophy. Hidalgo (2014)
speaks of antinomies within the democracy concept
meaning a “contradictoriness of two propositions which
both at the same time are reasonable, justified, and
valid” (Hidalgo, 2014, p. 29, own translation). More gen-
erally but focused on freedom and equality as well,
Berlin’s value pluralism claims that the “world…is one
in which we are faced with choices between equally ul-
timate ends, and claims that are equally absolute, the
realization of some must inevitably involve the sacrifice
of others” (Berlin, 1969, p. 168). Diamond and Morlino
(2004, p. 21) describe the idea of trade-offs within the
realm of democracies: “it is impossible to maximize all
[dimensions] at once. [Every] democratic country must
make an inherently value-laden choice about what kind
of democracy it wishes to be”.
Applied to our dimensional framework, relationships
become increasingly strained, especially when a dimen-
sion is rigidlymanifested. If we look at the features of the
dimensions on a scale, a convincing case can bemade for
the following thesis: whereas in most parts of the scale
the dimensions aremutually dependent and support one
another, seeking the maximum value results in a trade-
off. A choice for one side of the trade-off must be made.
What is a trade-off and how can we understand a trade-
off in democracies?
A relevant trade-off in democracies satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
• A trade-off is settled in the political sphere of
democracies: just as democracy is solely defined in
political and procedural terms (Munck, 2016, pp.
16–18), trade-offs are only relevant for the qual-
ity of democracy if they are in the political sphere.
Thus, trade-offs in the economic sphere (e.g. be-
tween policy goals) are excluded.
• A trade-off occurs because only one institution ful-
fills a specific political function in one dimension. At
the same time, however, this institution produces
necessarily opposed or inverse effects in another di-
mension linked to the same function. This relation-
ship means that a choice is forced between differ-
ent institutional designs accepting the advantages
but also the disadvantages of this specific realized
institutional solution.
• Contrasting but interrelated democracy concep-
tions offer different institutional solutions for the
same function: On the one hand, these concep-
tions carry equal normative weight, and can be
reasonably justified. The same level of quality of
democracy is accredited to them, which implies
that they and their institutional choices are neu-
tral in relation to the comprehensive quality of
democracy. On the other hand, every democracy
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Figure 1. Democracy Matrix. The numbers in parentheses refer to the trade-offs described in the article, the arrows repre-
sent the connectedness in which an increase of one dimension determines a decrease of the related dimension. Source:
Lauth (2004, 2015).
conception ultimately emphasizes different polit-
ical values while disregarding others (e.g. free-
dom over equality). This means they stress a dif-
ferent structuring of the same democratic qual-
ity. Therefore, institutions due to their linkage to
democracy conceptions highlight different democ-
racy dimensions.
• If an institution overemphasizes one pole of a
trade-off by neglecting the other pole completely,
an overstretching of a trade-off occurs, which dam-
ages the baseline concept: between the two poles
of a trade-off, there is a normative legitimate space
described by the democracy conceptions, in which
a democracy can place itself (Hidalgo, 2014).While
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a trade-off accentuates dimensions differently, it
still leaves the democracy dimension fully intact:
we would not speak of a trade-off anymore when
a democracy leaves this democratic space (e.g.
overemphasizing the control dimension at the cost
of the freedom dimension: a supreme court which
acts as a super-legislature). In this case, it damages
the baseline concept respective the mutual rein-
forcing effects between the dimensions.
These explanations distinguish two levels of abstraction:
institutions and dimensions. The basic statement is that
it is not possible to realize all three dimensions of the
Democracy Matrix in comprehensive manner because
they are unavoidably linked to trade-offs. This assump-
tion does not mean, however, that each democratic con-
ception as a liberal democracy or a republican democ-
racy must show trade-offs themselves. The reason is triv-
ial, such conceptions have already decided on their pre-
ferred dimensions. If you want to transfer the idea of
trade-offs to different democratic conceptions, onemust
maintain that it is not possible to realize two different
conceptions at the same time comprehensively. The nar-
row connection between institutions and dimensions al-
lows the measurement of dimensional trade-offs. The
tensions between the dimensions are manifested in in-
stitutional choices.
To sumup these considerations, a trade-off in democ-
racies is defined as follows: a trade-off is an irresolv-
able connectedness between two inverse effects of one
institution regarding two dimensions. This trade-off ex-
presses two contrasting but normative, equally weighted
democracy conceptions to which the selected institu-
tions belong.
The next step is to identify the relevant trade-offs,
keeping in mind that they exist between dimensions
but are measured on the corresponding institutional
level. We cannot discuss all the different conceptions of
democracy in this article. Therefore, we consider as our
starting point, the basic democracy principles, which are
identified by V-Dem. They derive from six different funda-
mental conceptions of democracy from democracy the-
ory: liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, ma-
joritarian and consensus democracy (Coppedge et al.,
2011, 2015).3 These six conceptions are considered as
normative equally justified. Thus, even though we agree
that “no single conception can reasonably purport to em-
body all the meanings of democracy” (Coppedge et al.,
2011, p. 253), we are convinced that with the help of the
trade-off concept, it is possible to create a single, overar-
ching and theoretical justified framework which is able
to capture those different notions of democracy. Four
concepts are especially helpful to discover relevant trade-
offs on the institutional level.
Majoritarian and consensus democracy (Lijphart,
2012) are obviously contrary democracy concepts (see
Table 1). The former focuses on majority rule, the lat-
ter on a vast system of checks and balances. Thus, while
consensus democracy stresses multiple structures of
veto points constraining the actions of governments (e.g.
strong second chamber, federalism, coalitions), the ideal
setup of majoritarian democracies favors structures with
lesser control abilities. Consensus democracy can also be
understood as a constitutional democracy which is char-
acterized by a government decision-making that “man-
dates a system of checks and balances, that includes, as
a key element, courts with the power of judicial review”
(Munck, 2016, p. 14). The possible collision between free-
dom and control is clearly reflected in the regulation of
constitutional control, that is the judicial review of the
decisions of government and parliament—the constitu-
tional limitation of political majority rule in the “consti-
tutional debate” (Elster & Slagstadt, 1988). We describe
these contrasting models as a trade-off: a constitutional
court increases the values for the control dimensions in
the function “guarantee of rights” and reduces the val-
ues of the freedom dimension in the function “rules set-
tlement and implementation” (see Figure 1).
The second, and perhaps even more principal oppos-
ing set is the divide between libertarian and egalitarian
conceptions of democracywhich relate to the tension be-
tween freedom and equality (see Table 2). Whereas egal-
itarian democracy would highlight political equality, lib-
ertarian democracy would focus on political liberty. This
Table 1. Trade-off between majoritarian and consensus democracy. Source: Own presentation.
Majoritarian Democracy Consensus Democracy
Function Effective government
High Weak
Institution Single party governments Oversized coalitions (5)
Unicameral system Bicameral system (6)
Unitarism Federalism
No supreme courts Supreme courts (4)
Dimension Freedom Control
3 Electoral democracy, another concept of democracy, is considered as a baseline concept by V-Dem and thus, is combined with the other conceptions.
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Table 2. Trade-off between libertarian and egalitarian democracy. Source: Own presentation.
Libertarian Democracy Egalitarian Democracy
Function Access to government; influence
Free Equal
Institution Plurality Voting PR (1)
Unregulated party finance Equal party finance (2)
Unregulated media access Equal media access (3)
Dimension Freedom Equality
trade-off has triggered profound ideological and philo-
sophical clashes (Dworkin, 1996). We can illustrate the
trade-offs between the two dimensions (freedom and
equality) by the following examples of institutions with
different characteristics.
Electoral systems can be arranged along two “repre-
sentation principles” (Nohlen, 2014, pp. 243–244). Pro-
portional representation (PR) increases the chances of
parties being represented in parliament. In parliamen-
tary systems, this often leads to compromises in the for-
mation of a government (coalitions), whichwould be less
necessary in majority elections (plurality voting system
or First Past the Post—FPTP). In the latter case, the elec-
torate has a higher degree of freedom in determining the
government than in PR-systems, where the coalition for-
mation is mostly decisive. Beyond government selection,
however, equal representation—asmeasured by the pro-
portionality factor—is reflected most comprehensively
in proportional electoral systems (Nohlen, 2014). While
disproportional electoral systems stress the freedom di-
mension, proportional electoral systems emphasize the
equality dimension.
A further trade-off can be found in the way of reg-
ulating political finance: “The way that political finance
should be regulated needs to be the result of a coun-
try’s political goals….To put it differently, since there is
no form of democratic governance that is preferred ev-
erywhere, there is no ultimate method of regulating po-
litical finance” (Ohman, 2014, p. 16). Two ideal types of
political finance can be distinguished. Whereas the egali-
tarian model of political finance emphasizes equal oppor-
tunities between candidates and/or parties through pub-
lic finance, the libertarian model of political finance has
a “lack of restrictions on expenditure and contributions,
market principles of access to the media [and] no public
funding” (Smilov, 2008, p. 3). This type conceives dona-
tions to parties or candidates as a freedom of expression.
Therefore, the libertarian political financemodel strength-
ens the freedom dimension within the function “regula-
tion of the intermediate sphere”, while the egalitarian po-
litical finance model focuses on the equality dimension.
Finally, the trade-off between libertarian and egali-
tarian media access follows the same considerations as
the political financing of political parties. A libertarian
media access “provides for market access to the media”
(Smilov, 2008, p. 9) giving more economically powerful
actorsmore possibilities, while the egalitarianmodel pro-
vides free media time for candidates and/or parties. This
trade-off concerns the “public communication” function
and the dimensions of “freedom” and “equality”.
2.3. Profiles of Democracies: The Interplay of the Two
Basic Relationships of Dimensions
The theoretical debate not only elucidates general trade-
offs between all core dimensions of democracy; it also
shows that they are interconnected and mutually sup-
portive. By combining themutual reinforcing effectswith
the trade-offs, we can obtain different profiles of democ-
racy. Thereby, each basic relationship serves a specific
task: the mutual reinforcing effects indicate the appro-
priate manifestation of a dimension. If a democracy is
present, the trade-off-relationship becomes important,
determining the final shape of the dimensions in the
upper spectrum of a working democracy. In principle,
democracy theory implies that an “optimal” or “perfect”
democracy cannot be based upon the complete realiza-
tion of all three dimensions, making the achievement of
the highest level of democratic quality in every dimen-
sion impossible. Maximizing the quality of democracy on
one dimension, necessarily sacrifices democracy quality
in another dimension. The decision involving the prefer-
ence given to which dimension(s) is a matter to be de-
cided by the democratic sovereign, the people. They de-
cide on which dimensions should be emphasized at the
cost of others resulting in diverging profiles.
Based on the dimensional framework of the Democ-
racy Matrix, three ideal typical profiles of democracies
can be distinguished (see Figure 2): a libertarian profile
of democracy, which maximizes the freedom dimension
at the cost of the others, an egalitarian profile of democ-
racy, which highlights the equality dimension and finally,
a control-focused profile of democracy emphasizing the
control dimension. Empirically, we will probably observe
hybrid types with specific profiles (e.g. high egalitarian
and control values combined with low freedom values).
3. A NewMeasurement Strategy: Quality Measuring
Indicators and Profile Measuring Indicators
Despite the lack of a deep theoretical discussion of trade-
offs by current measures, another problem, which is nei-
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Figure 2. Three profiles of democracies Source: Own presentation.
ther discussed nor resolved, exists on the methodolog-
ical level. If tensions among the dimensions exist, they
need to be accounted for at the indicator-level as well.
No approach of measuring democracy discusses trade-
offs in its methodological foundation. The consequences
of this oversight are reflected in the creation of indica-
tors. As no inherent relationships between indicators vis-
à-vis the tensions among dimensions are considered, the
indicators are not a valid measurement of trade-offs. On
the contrary, they systematically ignore them, because it
is not possible to measure a two-dimensional give-and-
take relationship with unidimensional indicators. There-
fore, no current measurement of democracy can detect
trade-offs. Recognized measurements—such as Polity
and Freedom House—present findings in which all the
indicators show the highest value (10 by Polity, 1 by Free-
dom House). Even the findings of the newer approaches
(Democracy Barometer, V-Dem) are no exception.
The main problem lies partly in the selection of indi-
cators, but also in their use—or more precisely, in the in-
terpretation of the relevant indicators. The solution con-
sists in the use of one indicator for the measurement of
two dimensions, but to evaluate it differently with regard
to each dimension. This procedurewill now be explained.
First and foremost, we have to differentiate between
two categories of indicators (see Table 3). The first cate-
gory includes the usual indicators which are commonly
found in the discipline (such as free elections). We call
this kind of indicators “qualitymeasuring indicators”. The
second category captures the realization of the trade-
offs via a two-dimensional interpretation. They express
the degree of tension between two normative equal con-
ceptions of democracy by assessing the structural ar-
rangement of a specific function (e.g. PR or plurality vot-
ing for the electoral system). These are neutral in the ag-
gregate, but sensitive to the differentiation of the dimen-
sions. The inherent tensions of these indicators are due
to their contradictory preferences with regard to the di-
mensions: If one indicator allows the highest grading in
a particular dimension, it necessarily prevents the high-
est grading in the corresponding dimension. We call this
type of indicators “trade-off indicators”.
The next task is to measure this difference with the
trade-off indicators. In order to do so, collected data
must be transformed in order to measure democracy, as
is necessary with many other indicators (Lauth, 2016).
The starting point of our consideration about election
systems is that both election systems satisfy the criteria
of a working democracy, even if they emphasize differ-
ent priorities (e.g. freedom vs. equality). For that reason,
the transformation of the data must take the threshold
of aworking democracy into account. In our concept, this
Table 3. Two types of indicators. Source: Own presentation.
Quality measuring indicators Trade-off indicators
Mutual reinforcing relationship of dimensions Conflicting relationship of dimensions
Universal: scale captures autocracies and democracies Only democracies
Gradual differences in the quality of democracy Equivalent differences in quality of democracy
Unidimensional interpretation Two-dimensional interpretation
Level of the quality of democracy Extent of trade-off
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threshold is at 0.75, the data of the (dis)proportionality
should be transformed into a scale from 0.75 to 1. This
difference of 0.25 is sufficient to illustrate the hypotheti-
cal trade-offs in the empirical research.
For the final assessment of the democratic quality of
elections, these values are multiplied with ratings from
the commonly used indicators for measuring elections
set at a 0 to 1 scale.4 Themultiplication strategy is neces-
sary to respect the assumption that trade-offs aremainly
pronounced in the higher areas of the dimensions. The
multiplication of both variables shows the highest dif-
ference in the profiles (0.75–1.0) when the quality of
democracy has the highest degree (1.0). The lower the
degrees of the quality, the less pronounced the profile
is. The effect, however, is also remarkable in the middle
ranges. This is due to the fundamental decision about the
institutional foundation of the profiles.
The proposed research strategy therefore combines
two measurements, one of regime rating and one of
trade-offs. Together they make it possible to assess the
quality of democracy and the shaping of its dimensions.
The main instrument is the dual interpretation of one
indicator in relation to two dimensions. An additional
methodological instrument is the setting of thresholds.
By using both instruments together and linking them
with conventional assessments, it is possible to construct
a method of measuring democracy that accurately takes
trade-offs into account. In applying this method, it is not
possible for all empirical cases to be rated with the high-
est values in every dimension. Lower values, however, do
not represent democratic deficiencies, but different pro-
files within the area of working democracies.
4. Empirical Findings: The Empirical Manifestations of
Profiles of Democracy
In this section, we illustrate our new approach by pre-
senting the results of a cluster analysis and, in addi-
tion, we show long-time developments of profiles for
single countries. The Democracy Matrix uses the V-Dem
dataset (Version 6.2, Coppedge et al., 2016) to measure
every singlematrix field and the trade-offs (see Figure A1
in the Annex for further details). We performed a hier-
archical cluster (Ward’s method) analysis with 94 cases
(working democracies)5 resulting in six clusters (see Fig-
ure 3). We find strong evidence for a control-focused
profile (cluster 2 and with a somewhat lower quality
of democracy cluster 3; e.g. The United States, Aus-
tralia and Switzerland) and a libertarian profile (cluster 4:
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Ireland). We find less
evidence for a genuine egalitarian democracy type but
there are two clusters with high equality values (clus-
ter 1 and 5): while cluster 1 has high values for the
equality and control dimension (e.g. Sweden, Norway
and Germany), cluster 5 combines slightly higher values
for the equality dimension than the control dimension
(Austria, Belgium andNetherlands). Therefore, both clus-
ters seem to be amix between an egalitarian and control-
focused democracy profile. Lastly, cluster 6 represents a
profile which balances all three dimensions.
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Figure 3. Results of the cluster analysis. Cluster size: 19 (1), 17 (2), 15 (3), 10 (4), 21 (5), 12 (6). Source: Own calculation
based on the V-Dem-Dataset (Version 6.2; Coppedge et al., 2016).
4 For example, the quality measuring indicators show for both countries (A and B) the highest democratic quality for all dimensions (1). Country A has
a FPTP voting system emphasizing the freedom dimension over the equality dimension, but country B uses a PR electoral system highlighting the equal-
ity dimension in contrast to the freedom dimension. This trade-off indicator shows for country A the values 1 (freedom dimension) and 0.75 (equality
dimension), this is vice versa for country B. Multiplying the quality measuring and trade-off indicators gives the values 1 (freedom dimension) and 0.75
(equality dimension) for country A and the opposite result for country B, showing the different structuring of the same quality of democracy.
5 To increase the sample size and the varieties of profiles, we pooled the data for 1970, 1990 and 2010. Thus, some cases are included in the analysis
more than once.
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We now show the empirical development of pro-
files for single countries and contrast the results from
the quality-measuring indicators alone with our com-
bined measurement approach using trade-off-indicators
as well. Excluding clusters 3 and 6 due to the some-
what lower quality of democracy, we selected those
cases which are prototypical for the other four clusters
(Germany, United States, United Kingdom and Belgium).
The left side of Figure 4 shows the results of the qual-
ity measuring indicators alone, whereas the right side
shows the results of the trade-off indicators multiplied
with the quality measuring indicators. The difference be-
tween the left and the right side is noticeable: Overall,
we gain only small differences between the dimensions
using the quality measuring indicators alone (left side).
The United States and, since 1990, the United Kingdom
seem to be an exception showing considerably lower val-
ues for the equality dimension. When we add the trade-
off indicators, we are able to gain more profound pro-
files of democracy (right side).Whereas high values in ev-
ery dimension of the quality measuring indicators can be
achieved; trade-offs are only visible using our new mea-
surement strategy.
For example, Germany combines high control and
equality values with lower values for freedom (mixed
type of an egalitarian and control-focused democracy).
This profile has not changed since 1950. The United
States combines high control and freedom values with
lower values for equality (mixed type of a libertarian
and control-focused democracy). This profile is constant
throughout history, but there was a short time increase
of equality between 2000 and 2010. Compared to the
left side of Figure 4, the control dimension of the United
States reaches higher values than the freedom dimen-
sion, emphasizing that the differences on the left side
are differences in the quality of democracy rather than
“real” trade-offs between dimensions. The democracy
profile of the United Kingdom consists of high values
for freedom combined with lower values for control and
equality (libertarian democracy). Since 1990, we can de-
tect a significant increase of the control dimension for
this case, which is congruent to the findings of quali-
tative studies (Strohmeier, 2011). Lastly, Belgium’s pro-
file consists of higher values for equality with interme-
diate values for the control dimension and low values
for the freedomdimension (mixed type between egalitar-
ian and control-focused democracy). Belgium changed
to this profile since the 1980 by increasing the equal-
ity dimension.
5. Conclusions
This article shows that the differentiation between a mu-
tual reinforcing relationship and a conflicting relation-
ship between dimensions is fruitful: the former type of
relationship expresses the interdependence of the di-
mensions, so that one dimension cannot exist without
the other. The latter relationship captures the idea that
not all dimensions can be maximized simultaneously:
“ramping up” a dimension to the highest degree possible
taking a loss in another dimension. Thismeans that every
democracy has to choose between a precarious balance
of contentious dimensions.
To detect the relevant trade-offs, the starting point of
our discussion are fundamental conceptions of democ-
racy, mainly embedded in the Democracy Matrix. We
propose a set of trade-offs for libertarian vs. egalitarian,
and majoritarian vs. consensus conceptions of democ-
racy. Finally, we construct three ideal types of profiles
of democracy on the basis of the trade-offs: a libertarian,
an egalitarian, and a control-focused profile.
We introduce a new measurement and aggregation
strategy justified by a conceptual foundation. The two
types of relationships are operationalized using on the
one hand quality-measuring indicators and on the other
hand trade-off indicators. While quality-measuring indic-
tors follow a unidimensional interpretation—the current
standard in this research field, the additional measure-
ment with trade-off indicators uses a double evaluation
linked to different dimensions. Using the V-Dem dataset,
we showed preliminary empirical findings of our new
measurement tool, the Democracy Matrix. These find-
ings indicate that we can empirically discover our pro-
posed ideal typical democracy profiles but that there is a
wide variety of hybrid profiles as well.
This result differs from the findings of the Democracy
Barometer and the Varieties of Democracy which both
are not capable of detecting trade-offs. The choice of the-
oretical conception as well as the measurement strategy
matters. Whereas the Democracy Barometer proposes
one specific type of democracy as being the benchmark
for the quality of democracy (the liberal democracy in the
form of the embedded democracy),6 V-Dem offers sev-
eral types. But in contrast to the Democracy Matrix, it
lacks a comprehensive meta theory of trade-offs which
not only recognizes those types as normative equal but
focuses on their interwoven relationship as well.
New research questions consist in the further theo-
retical and empirical examination of the different pro-
files of democracy: On the theoretical level, it seems
that all trade-offs involve the freedom dimension. Why
is the freedom dimension so significant in this regard?
Is it more relevant than the other two dimensions? On
the empirical level, we can analyze the change of pro-
files throughout time in countries (e.g. Belgium’s change
to more egalitarian values since the 1980s) and their re-
spective causes. Another question concerns the interplay
of democracy profiles and governance structures as well
as policy-outputs (similar to Lijphart, 2012). Does the
control-focused profile have a higher risk of a reformgrid-
6 Similar to the Democracy Barometer, Munck’s (2016) well informed reconceptualization of the quality of democracy ranks one specific democracy
model higher than the others. He proposes a majoritarian democracy—mixed with PR elections—as a benchmark for the quality of democracy. This
seems, however, highly problematic.
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Figure 4. Empirical results. Source: Own calucation based on the V-Dem-Dataset (Version 6.2; Coppedge et al., 2016). The
left side shows the results for the quality measuring indicators; the right side presents the findings of the new measure-
ment approach which combines the quality measuring and profile measuring indicators. The colors are as follows: red
= freedom dimension, blue = control dimension, green = equality dimension.
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lock? Does the egalitarian profile coincide with a strong
welfare state? These research questions are opened up
by the conceptualization andmeasurement of trade-offs
and should be approached in future research projects.
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Annex
1. Aggregation Method of the Democracy Matrix
1.1. Aggregation Method for Quality Measuring Indicators
Here, we use a very similar aggregation technique as V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2016).
• The lowest parts of our concept trees (indicators: V-Dem relative scale): mean;
• CDF of the mean (normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1) resulting in a value between 0 and 1;
• We use the following formula (see V-Dem) for aggregation up to the matrix field level:
ComponentA * ComponentB * 0.5 + ComponentA * 0.25 + ComponentB * 0.25
The left side of this formula (ComponentA * ComponentB * 0.5) incorporates the necessary condition (no compensa-
tion) whereas the right part of the formula (ComponentA * 0.25 + ComponentB * 0.25) allows some compensation.
If our concept demands a strict necessary condition, we weight the left part of the formula more heavily (> 0.5) in
contrast to the right part (< 0.5). If our concept does require a “softer” necessary condition, more weight to the
right part is given (> 0,5) at the cost of the left part (< 0.5). In addition, the right side of the formula allows for a
precise weighting of the different components;
• Dimensions (transformational status): multiplication of the related matrix fields to the power of (1/5):
Dimqual = (Fieldqual1 * Fieldqual2 * Fieldqual3 * Fieldqual4 * Fieldqual5) ̂ (1/5)
1.2. Aggregation Method for Profile Measuring Indicators
• We use only a subset of the V-Dem-Data: every country which has a value > 0.5 in every matrix field measured by
the quality measuring indicators is included;
• For each trade-off indicator the empirical minimum is set to 0.75, empirical maximum to 1;
• Dual use of these indicators, e.g. libertarian party finance models gain a 1 in the freedom dimension and a 0.75 in
the equality dimension; egalitarian party finance models gain 0.75 in the freedom dimension and a 1 in the equality
dimension;
• If more than one trade-off is located in a matrix field, weighting applies.
1.3. Combining Quality Measuring and Profile Measuring Indicators
• The empirical results of thematrix fieldsmeasured by the qualitymeasuring indicators aremultipliedwith the related
trade-offs:
Fieldprofile = Fieldqual * trade_off
• Dimensions (Democracy profiles): Multiplication of the related matrix fields to the power of (1/5):
Dimprofile = (Fieldprofile1 * Fieldprofile2 * Fieldprofile3 * Fieldprofile4 * Fieldprofile5) ̂ (1/5)
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Figure A1. Concept tree for matrix field “Procedures of decision/Freedom”. Source: Own presentation; the indicators can
be found in the V-Dem-Codebook (Coppedge et al., 2016).
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